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National Preparedness: Challenges, Definitions &
Jurisdictions
ARTICLE

COMMENTS

by JORDAN NELMS & AMANDA FAUL

Wed, May 22, 2013
In late 2 01 1 , the U.S. Departm ent of Hom eland Security
(DHS) released the second docum ent in the series of
Presidential Policy Directiv e 8: National Preparedness
(PPD-8) guidance. Although the initial release of the
National Preparedness Goal re-em phasized the use of a
capabilities-based approach to preparedness, the National
Preparedness Sy stem (NPS) description identified the
process by which the nation should build and sustain its
em ergency m anagem ent and hom eland security
capabilities, organized in accordance with the fiv e m ission
areas spelled out by PPD-8: prev ention, protection, m itigation, response, and
recov ery . The NPS builds on sev eral y ears of capabilities-based preparedness by
updating the 2 007 National Preparedness Guidelines with a process that
m atches the National Preparedness Goal’s Core Capabilities.

After the term
"risk" has been
defined for a
particular
jurisdiction,
organizations and
agencies can begin
to address the risk
assessments,
capability
estimates, and
validation
challenges that
they probably will
face.

At a surprisingly concise six pages, the “NPS Description” actually prov ides
v ery little in the way of concrete and actionable steps, rely ing on
supplem entary guidance – in the form of Com prehensiv e Preparedness Guides
and the Hom eland Security Exercise and Ev aluation Program – to prov ide the
granular details on how to transform concept into practice. The NPS also
incorporates the new DHS grant perform ance requirem ents of com pleting: (a) a
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessm ent (THIRA); (b) a State
Preparedness Report; and (c) the forthcom ing Capability Estim ation Process.
Hav ing concluded the first required THIRA, which set the scope for the data
collection and analy sis needed for the State Preparedness Report, the states and
m ajor m etropolitan areas in the Urban Area Security Initiativ e (UASI)
program m et the FY 2 01 2 DHS grant perform ance requirem ents – m ostly by
trial and error, though, because they had no “best practices” to draw upon.
Nonetheless, the FY 2 01 3 DHS grant guidance will place ev en greater em phasis
on the NPS as a driv ing m echanism for preparedness inv estm ent – m ostly by
incorporating capability estim ation as the analy sis tool between the THIRA’s
capability preparedness targets and the capability preparedness scoring of the
State Preparedness Report. For the third straight y ear, state and m ajor urban
areas will hav e to further enhance their ability to im plem ent the NPS in order
to rem ain in com pliance with DHS grants.
NPS im plem entation can usually be broken down into two m ajor categories:
organization and process. States and m ajor urban areas with existing
preparedness program s – usually based on legacy national preparedness
program s or “hom egrown” program s – m ay well be challenged with adapting
their program s to m eet the new requirem ents. Following are som e of the m ore
im portant aspects of the two categories m entioned abov e.
Organization: An Emphasis on Core Capabilities
One of the m ost im portant com ponents of em ergency preparedness is the people
directly inv olv ed. State and local gov ernm ents im plem enting the NPS,
therefore, will probably run into an organizational challenge when crafting
their NPS im plem entation strategies. Interagency em ergency preparedness
program s at the state and local lev els rely heav ily on functional groupings,
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prim arily based on the em ergency support function structure of the National
Response Fram ework. In the alm ost 1 2 y ears that hav e passed since the 9 /1 1
terrorist attacks, the em ergency support function structure has been an
essential com ponent of m ost state and local em ergency m anagem ent agencies.
Howev er, this institutionalized coordinating structure does not m esh well with
the organization of the National Preparedness Goal’s Core Capabilities.
The NPS’s em phasis on capabilities organized by m ission area is not an exact
replication of the em ergency support function construct, a bothersom e reality
that leav es at least som e em ergency m anagers confused about how to reconcile
the differences. Adding to this challenge is the fact that the functional
groupings within the National Disaster Recov ery Fram ework – i.e., the
recov ery support functions – represent a departure from the em ergency
support function construct. Howev er, it appears that the recov ery core
capabilities were dev eloped with the pre-existing National Disaster Recov ery
Fram ework in m ind.
To com plicate m atters ev en further, PPD-8 places responsibility on an
organization to be the ov erall lead in coordinating each m ission area’s
capabilities set. The prim ary choice for the traditional em ergency
m anagem ent m ission areas of m itigation, response, and recov ery is the
em ergency m anagem ent agencies, but it is not y et clear who or what agency
should take ownership of the prev ention and protection m issions. Ultim ately ,
agency authorities will hav e to dictate both the lead and the support roles, but
sev eral hard decisions will first hav e to be m ade.
The State Preparedness Report suggests that a tiered approach to data collection
– em phasizing the use of intrastate em ergency m anagem ent or hom eland
security regions – m ight be the best alternativ e av ailable. By using a regional
approach, which recognizes the reliance on m utual aid and assistance in
em ergency operations, local jurisdictions would, in theory , report capability
preparedness inform ation to their regional working group(s); the latter would
in turn report up the line to the state em ergency m anagem ent agency .
Unfortunately , this prim arily geographic v iew of em ergency preparedness
becom es som ewhat problem atic when integrating statewide agencies and
partners such as nonprofit organizations, as well as state agencies with local
offices that support local em ergency operations. Thoughtful consideration m ust
be giv en to the role of intergov ernm ental coordination if an em ergency
preparedness program is to be successful.
Process: Six or More Steps – And Lower Barriers
The first step in im plem enting the NPS process for states and m ajor urban areas
is to thoroughly consider the six steps and determ ine whether: (a) v arious
elem ents hav e to be added or subtracted; and/or (b) if the six steps should be
further div ided in order to m ake the sy stem actionable to the extent needed to
m eet the challenges of a particular jurisdiction. Many of the steps that
encom pass the NPS would hav e to cov er sev eral program s when im plem ented –
a requirem ent that could be cum bersom e in itself and also could cause
confusion related to program adm inistration and ov ersight.
Although it is im portant that a “custom ized” im plem entation of the NPS not
require too m any steps, the goal should be to dev ise a sy stem that would
actually reduce barriers to participation by , am ong other things, increasing
the specificity of tasks and spelling out the accountability for each. After a
custom ized im plem entation has been dev eloped, there are sev eral other
challenges that m ust be addressed to fully realize how v arious capabilities will
be built, deliv ered, and ev aluated. Following is a brief analy sis of the m ost
im portant of those challenges.
Risk assessment challenges – The first requirem ent in this area is to determ ine
the definition of “risk” that the jurisdiction will use to fully identify threats and
hazards and, by doing so, assess the risk posed by each. The THIRA and the
hazard m itigation planning related to hazard identification and risk assessm ent
are am ong the m ore im portant tools to use in this step, but each jurisdiction
m ust ultim ately decide how it wants to ev aluate the risk to the com m unity
posed by each threat or hazard considered.
The threat and hazard identification process driv es the form ulation of specific
preparedness targets, as well as preparedness goals, that v arious jurisdictions
m ust dev elop. The preparedness target identifies what the jurisdiction needs to
fully deliv er a specific capability . Capability targets m ust be based in turn on
the understanding, on the part of jurisdiction leaders, of what they are
preparing for, which would be either: (a) the realistic consequences of the
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threats and hazards they face; or (b) the m ost likely im pacts of a catastrophic
occurrence. For UASI states, harm onizing the THIRA is critical to ensuring
consistency between capability targets at both the state and UASI lev els.
Capability estimation challenges – Capability estim ation inv olv es: (a)
determ ining the plans, organization, equipm ent, training, and exercise
elem ents required to build and sustain a specific capability ; and (b) com paring
those requirem ents to the actual resources and activ ities av ailable to
determ ine any gap that rem ains. When conducting a capability assessm ent, it
is im portant to interface not only with neighboring jurisdictions but also with
state and regional partners. Such collaboration could result in capability
estim ates that consistently m easure capability requirem ents and allow for
inform ation sharing, particularly inform ation related to im plem entation of the
National Incident Managem ent Sy stem . Effectiv e state-to-local jurisdiction
coordination and com m unication also ensures that resources are not double
counted as both a local and a state asset. The potential to ov erestim ate
resources through double counting is particularly high in areas where state
agencies hav e local offices that support local em ergency operations.
Capability validation challenges – For capability v alidation, it is im portant that
a consistent policy be used to determ ine when it is appropriate for after-action
reporting. It is unrealistic to require a form al after-action process each and
ev ery tim e a capability is deliv ered. For exam ple, coping with a m ulti-v ehicle
collision inv olv ing the potential spill of hazardous m aterials requires sev eral
core capabilities – critical transportation, env ironm ental response/health and
safety , on-scene security and protection, and public health and m edical
serv ices. Such incidents are relativ ely com m on in som e jurisdictions. To
require an after-action report for all such situations in those jurisdictions,
though, could be unduly cum bersom e and m ight ultim ately result in
unnecessary paperwork and capability v alidation data. Am ong the potential
thresholds that should be considered in such cases are the following: (a) The
num ber of capabilities deliv ered; (b) any rem aining challenges identified that
require im prov em ent; (c) significant im prov em ents in the deliv ery of the
v arious capabilities needed; and (d) the num ber of agencies inv olv ed in the
deliv ery of those capabilities.
The Scarcity of Best Practices & Other Pitfalls
One continuing challenge that state and local jurisdictions m ust face as they
m ov e forward with im plem enting PPD-8 is the lim ited num ber of existing best
practices that hav e already been v alidated. Each jurisdiction will, therefore,
either hav e to dev elop a preparedness sy stem process from the ground up or
wait for other jurisdictions to dev elop best practices that can be adapted to fit
the needs of other locales.
Nonetheless, political and operational jurisdictions m ust conduct their own
thorough and sy stem atic capability estim ates and dev elop the processes needed
to build, m aintain, and ev aluate the v arious capabilities required. Any
jurisdictions that will not or cannot do this will lack the accurate and consistent
data on resource gaps that they will need to m ake their own future resource
procurem ent and allocation decisions. Beginning the process by giv ing full and
objectiv e consideration of the potential pitfalls identified abov e can help ease
the ov erall sy stem dev elopm ent decisions required.
For m ost states and m ajor urban areas, im plem entation of the NPS has becom e
a necessity for m any reasons, but particularly to continue receiv ing DHS grant
funding. It also is im portant, though, that the DHS itself recognize the
challenges that lower-lev el jurisdictions will face in m eeting the National
Preparedness Goal, specifically including giv ing thoughtful consideration to the
quantity and v ariety of resources required to som etim es totally transform
legacy preparedness program s that are no longer v alid or effectiv e.
________________________
Jordan Nelms (pictured) is the Planning Branch Manager at the Maryland
Emergency Management Agency, and previously worked as a contractor with Witt
Associates supporting the PPD-8 Program Executive Office at the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. He received a BA in political science/security
studies from East Carolina University and pursued graduate studies at the Johns
Hopkins University, the University of South Florida, and the University of St.
Andrews in Scotland.
Amanda Faul, a policy analyst with the University of Maryland’s Center for Health
& Homeland Security, currently works as a regional planner for the Maryland
Emergency Management Agency. Prior to assuming that post, she worked as a

http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Industry/Standards/National_Preparedness:_Challenges,_Definitions_&_Jurisdictions/

3/4

7/25/2014

Article Detail - Domestic Preparedness

disaster planner for the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, California. She
holds a Master’s degree in public health, with a concentration in emergency public
health and disasters, from the University of California, Los Angeles.
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